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Abstract 
Total fertility in the Catholic countries of Southern Europe has dropped to remarkably low rates 
(=1.4) despite continuing low rates female labor force participation and high historic fertility. We 
model three ways in which religion affects the demand for children – through norms, market 
wages, and childrearing costs. We estimate these effects using new panel data on church 
attendance and clergy employment for thirteen European countries from 1960-2000, spanning 
the Second Vatican Council (1962-65). Using nuns per capita as a proxy for service provision, 
we estimate fertility effects on the order of 300 to 400 children per nun.  Moreover, nuns 
outperform priests as a predictor of fertility, suggesting that changes in childrearing costs 
dominate changes in theology and norms.  Reduced church attendance also predicts fertility 
decline, but only for Catholics, not for Protestants.  Service provision and attendance 
complement each other, a finding consistent with club models of religion. 
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1. Introduction 
Southern European birth rates fell so rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s that in one generation the 
region went from Europe’s highest fertility to its lowest. Unless total fertility increases 
substantially, the native-born population is destined to further age and shrink. This phenomenon 
has been noted by many scholars (Munoz-Perez, 1989, studies fertility in Italy, Greece, Portugal 
and Spain in detail.) An aging and shrinking population has major economic implications, 
generating demand for young immigrant workers and threatening the solvency of “pay as you 
go” social insurance funds. Italy and Spain are thus projected to have one retiree for each 
working age person by 2050. Increased morbidity due to an aging population will also strain the 
funding of publicly provided health care. 
 
Understanding fertility trends in Southern Europe is important for projecting global 
population, especially if the trends reflect general consequences of economic development and 
social change. The consequences of policies concerning immigration, education, health and 
retirement all depend upon population trends. Yet demographers remain puzzled by the causes of 
European fertility decline, particularly since the decline has occurred without a rapid increase in 
female labor force participation (Bettio and Villa, 1998; Ahn and Mira, 2002; Guetto et al, 
2015).  Southern Europe currently has historically low rates of both fertility and female 
participation. In Spain, Italy and Portugal total fertility remain below 1.4, despite female 
employment rates below European averages.2 This pattern contradicts standard economic models 
(Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1991), is unprecedented in the history of fertility transition, 
and cannot be explained by factors such as housing prices or women’s education (Del Boca, 
2002). 
 
We argue that changes in the Catholic Church, and especially changes in the Church’s 
provision of social services, are key to the observed decline in fertility. For an indication of 
Catholicism’s possible relevance, see Figure 1, which plots total fertility rates (TFR) for three 
categories of Western European nations: the Catholic countries (with more than 70% of the 
population Catholic – Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,); the Protestant 
(with 70% or more Protestants – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK); and other countries 
(with neither religion dominant or with a history of strong separation between religious and 
national institutions – France3, Germany, Greece, Netherlands and Switzerland). In the 1970’s, 
fertility rates in Catholic countries exceeded that of the non-Catholic countries by nearly half a 
child per woman. But by the 1990s, fertility in these same Catholic countries had declined so 
rapidly that it averaged half a child less than that of the Protestant countries -- a gap that 
continues throug the present. 
 
Why did fertility decline so rapidly in highly Catholic countries?  General declines in 
religiosity cannot provide the answer, since church attendance and other measures of religiosity 
                                                
2 Eurostat figures for 2015. 
3 Since the French Revolution, French governments have repeatedly limited the activities of the Catholic Church, 
particularly the service provision most relevant to this study. Hence, “by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Church had lost all connection to the French state, religious instruction was forbidden, and religious orders were 
forbidden to teach in private schools” (Warner 2000: 62, c.f. Lee and Piveteau 1967). Wilde (2007) emphasizes that 
French Bishops at the Second Vatican Council were strongly allied with the Northern European ecumenical 
reformers rather than with the conservatives from the other majority Catholic countries.  
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declined more in Protestant countries than Catholic during the years in question. Nor can the 
explanation be a change in Catholic doctrine on birth control since these teachings have not 
changed. Nor do changes in personal compliance with those teaching supply the answer, since 
insofar as such changes have occurred, the changes have been as great or greater outside of 
Southern Europe.  
 
We offer an alternative explanation: the Catholic Church retreated in the mid -1960s from 
providing a variety of family-friendly services that had previously reduced the cost of Catholic 
childrearing.  Nuns were key to the provision of those services, and the Second Vatican council 
of 1962-65 (known as “Vatican II”) led to a dramatic decline in the number of nuns (as well as 
priests) and thus raised the cost of childrearing. 
 
Consistent with this explanation, our empirical results show that cross-country variation 
in the decline in nuns per Catholic is a strong predictor of differential fertility decline in 
European countries between 1960 and 2000. The variance underlying that inference comes from 
the interaction of cross-country variation in the pre-Council level of nuns per Catholic with post-
Vatican II attrition of nuns, which has slightly different timing across countries.  
 
Church attendance among Catholics also declined sharply after Vatican II.  But this by 
itself would probably not have led to fertility decline, given that fertility is unrelated to 
attendance among Protestants.  Among Catholics, the effect of reduced attendance seems to be 
particularly strong when service provision is high – a complementarity that is consistent with 
club models of religion.  Within religious clubs, services are preferentially provided to members 
who participate more extensively – attending more, contributing more, demonstrating more 
belief and commitment, etc.. Services provided by priests are a poorer predictor of fertility than 
those provided by nuns, suggesting that it is social services rather than theological services that 
most dramatically affect costs of childrearing. Indeed, nuns appear to increase fertility by a 
remarkable 300 to 400 children per nun.  
 
These results have strong implications for public policy, as they indicate that the 
availability of relatively inexpensive, family-friendly services has sharp effects on fertility, with 
each additional service provider predicting hundreds more children born. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on religion, 
economics, and fertility, and sets out our conjectures in detail. Section 3 describes institutional 
aspects of the Catholic Church, including the Second Vatican Council. In Section 4 we provide a 
simple framework for estimation which allows religious institutions to affect fertility through 
both theological and service provision channels. Section 5 describes our data, Section 6 reports 
estimation results and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.	Literature	
Our approach combines insights from two literatures: economic demography and the economics 
of religion. Economic demography explains the importance of childhood mortality and female 
labor force participation (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker, 1991). Becker’s quality-quantity 
theory emphasizes the role of rising female earnings in increasing the cost of raising numerous 
children relative to that of child “quality” (education, health, etc.), inducing mothers to give birth 
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to fewer children while investing more resources invested in each child. Yet female labor force 
participation is now associated with relatively high fertility across countries in Europe, 
contradicting the prediction of the Becker model. Childhood mortality rates are low and stable in 
Europe so they cannot explain falling fertility either.  
 
Bongaarts (1999) suggested that uniquely low European total fertility rates in the 1990s 
may under-predict eventual fertility, and that women will compensate later in life for the low 
fertility of their 20s. Yet no such recovery in total fertility rates has been observed as those 
women have reached their 50s, making a subsequent fertility increase unlikely. Daniela Del Boca  
(2002, Del Boca et al, 2003) has argued that Southern European labor market institutions are 
very unfavorable to working mothers, with poor provision of child care and few part time jobs 
available with benefits. She reasons that rather than work or raise children, young women wait 
(typically living with parents) until they obtain a job that accommodates motherhood. de Laat 
and Sevilla-Sanz (2006) offer an analogous explanation based on norms, arguing that Southern 
European fathers are less willing to care for children, increasing the shadow cost of child rearing 
for potential working mothers and augmenting the substitution effect of rising women’s wages 
on fertility. Giuliano (2007) links the gender role attitudes of Southern Europeans to low labor 
force participation in both Europe and the U.S.  Our theory offers an alternative but 
complementary set of explanations grounded in the Catholic Church’s historic role as a major 
provider of institutional and normative support for fertility and childrearing,  
 
Past studies find links between religiosity and fertility (Stolzenberg, Bair-Loy, et al. 
1995), particularly in Southern Europe (Lehrer 1995; Lehrer 1996). Differential fertility among 
Catholics and Protestants in the U.S. have been studied extensively, and Westoff and Jones 
(1979) showed that Catholics experienced an amplified baby boom – higher completed fertility 
in the 1950s (by about one child per family), followed by rapid fertility decline in the 1960s and 
1970s that eliminated the Catholic / Non-Catholic fertility differential by the mid-1970s. Westoff 
and Jones also found that among Catholics, religiosity (as measured by rates of taking 
communion) was associated with higher fertility in the 1950s and 1960s but not in the 1970s. 
Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985) found that Catholics have more children even after adjusting for 
other socioeconomic factors, such as maternal education. Sander (1992) takes issue with a causal 
interpretation of the effect of Catholicism on fertility, reporting evidence that couples who prefer 
large families are more likely to remain Catholic or convert to Catholicism.  
 
Research by Adsera (2006) examines the role of religion and religiosity in Spain. Using 
data from the 1985 and 1999 Spanish Fertility Surveys, she finds that fertility among practicing 
(church-going) Catholics of the mid-1980s was no higher than fertility than fertility among non-
practicing Catholics. Yet by the late-1990s, after 15 years of decline in attendance rates, the 
practicing Catholics did have higher fertility. A companion paper using International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) data shows that Spain in 1985 may be an anomaly (Adsera, 2006). In the 
thirteen OECD countries surveyed by the 1994 ISSP, higher church attendance is associated with 
significantly higher desired fertility in all countries for women and in all but two countries for 
men. This leaves open the possibility that a decline in religiosity has contributed to declining 
fertility in highly Catholic countries besides Spain. 
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Club-theoretic models drawn from the economics of religion predict that communally-
oriented “sectarian” religions will tend to have high fertility even in the absence of explicit 
pronatalist theology because they induce women to voluntarily adopt prohibitions that allow the 
group to effectively provide a set of local public (club) goods. Those prohibitions lower the 
opportunity cost of childrearing insofar by reducing women’s access to secular consumption and 
labor markets.4  Catholicism is not particularly sectarian, but if religiosity can strongly affect 
sectarian fertility through social service provision, it should not be surprising to see analogous 
effects in religions with less strict prohibitions and practices. 
	
3.	The	Second	Vatican	Council	and	Fertility	
	
3.1 The Social Consequences of Communal Religion 
Given that most religious groups encourage fertility, cross-group variation is more likely to 
reflect variation in a group’s capacity implement fertility norms than variation in the norms 
themselves. Scholars have long recognized that religions are social phenomenon in which 
collective activities underpin religion’s capacity to constrain behavior and maintain institutions. 
They have also recognized that some religions are more strongly collective than others. Adam 
Smith (1965: 748-750) observed that “strict or austere” systems of morality are far more 
common in “little religious sects” than in government-regulated “established churches.” 
Subsequent generations of scholars developed insights like these into a full-blown theory of 
religious organization. Sociologist Emile Durkheim (1965: 62) argued that collectivity explained 
how “religion,” but never “magic,” could sustain “moral communities” governed by “unified 
systems of beliefs and practices.” 
 
For European sociologists of the 19th and early-20th centuries, a stronger communal 
orientation likewise distinguished Catholicism from mainstream (state-church) Protestantism. 
The social consequences of this difference ranged from lower rates of suicide among Catholics 
(Durkheim, 1965, Becker and Woessmann, 2011) to more rapid economic development among 
Protestants (according to Weber (1946)). Despite lingering debate over these inferences (for 
                                                
4 That argument starts with Iannaccone’s (1992) model of religious sects as clubs that provide quasi-public services 
to members. To limit free-riding sects impose prohibitions, so-called “stigmas,” that indirectly tax (non-group) 
market activities. At the margin, members respond by shifting hours away from the labor force and into non-market 
activities which benefit the club. Because of the positive externalities associated with club activities, those 
prohibitions benefit club members. The club model provides a coherent rational-choice theory that explains 
otherwise puzzling behavior of strict sectarian denominations. It also rationalizes more mild prohibitions 
characteristic of merely “conservative” churches such as contemporary evangelical Protestants, traditional Catholics 
and Orthodox Jews. Berman (2000) marries the club approach to Becker’s (1991) theory of fertility, showing that 
prohibitions increase the effective tax on market labor, thereby reducing real wages. The effect of these prohibitions 
for women is to make investments of market resources in child “quality” more difficult to achieve while making 
quantity more attainable, with a resulting increase in fertility. (For a formal derivation, see Berman (2000) or 
Berman and Stepanyan (2003). High fertility is in fact associated with sectarianism among Christians, Ultra-
Orthodox Jews (Berman, 2000), and Radical Islamists (Berman, 2009). This could be due to mechanisms at either 
the individual or the group level. Berman (2000) shows that increased subsidies to the group induced dramatic 
fertility increases of one or two children per woman over a decade among Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews. This 
suggests a group-level mechanism as predicted by the club model, particularly since this rapid fertility increase 
occurred without any change in Orthodox Jewish theology regarding births or birth control. Amplification through 
shared norms is possible as well, as in Becker and Murphy (2000) and Iannaccone (1999). For a recent survey of the 
Economics of Religion, see Iyer (2016). 
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example Becker and Woessmann, 2009), most religious researchers broadly agree that the 
Catholic Church traditionally promoted stronger group identity and sustained a broader array of 
institutions than did any Protestant state church. The scholarly consensus about Catholicism, 
communalism, and behavioral constraints suggests that fertility might well be another behavior 
sustained more effectively by Catholicism than Protestantism. Official Catholic doctrine favors 
fertility and opposes all forms of birth control and abortion, and Catholicism has traditionally 
been associated with large family size. 
 
3.2 The Second Vatican Council and Declining Catholic Religious Activity 
Yet communalism requires institutions, and the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) led to 
broad-based institutional decline within Catholicism. The losses included reductions in the 
number of people becoming or remaining priests, even larger reductions in the number of nuns, 
reduced mass attendance among the Catholic laity, and increased willingness among Catholics to 
question official doctrine, including prohibitions on divorce and birth control (Hout and Greeley 
1987; Greeley 1989; Schoenherr and Young 1993: 10-12; Stark and Finke 2000: 169-190). 
Although scholars continue to debate why Vatican II had these effects, the decline itself is 
universally acknowledged. 
 
Scholars view the Second Vatican Council as a massive exogenous shock -- more 
consequential than any other change to Catholicism in the past several centuries.5  Both 
contemporaneous and historical accounts stress Vatican II’s surprising character – particularly 
for parish priests, nuns, and ordinary Catholics (Dolan 1985: 421-454; Hoge and Wenger 2003: 
7-12). The Pope (John XXIII) who initiated Vatican II was 77 years old when elected in 1958 
and was widely expected to serve as an interim “caretaker” (and he did indeed die within five 
years of his election).  Only one other general council had ever been called – in 1870 – and its 
effect had been to resist change and reaffirm Church tradition. Thus, even those who applauded 
the Pope’s decision to convene the Council in 1962 could not have known that his call for 
“updating” would eventually affect scores of doctrines and practices that for hundreds of years 
had distinguished Catholicism from Protestantism.  
Likewise, the architects of Vatican II failed to anticipate the consequences of their 
reforms. Catholicism had been growing for a hundred years or more, and the 1946-1965 post-war 
period had witnessed especially rapid growth: in total number of Catholics, in church attendance 
rates, in the numbers of priests and nuns, and in Catholic schools and hospitals. To the great 
surprise and dismay of Catholics everywhere (and especially the Catholic hierarchy), all these 
growth trends reversed immediately after Vatican II. Among the hundreds of historians, 
sociologists, and religious scholars who have analyzed the Vatican II era with methods ranging 
from textual analysis to survey research, we encounter nearly unanimous agreement: the decline 
was unanticipated and precipitated primarily by changes initiated by the Church hierarchy, rather 
than by external events or changes (such as trends in income, education, or female employment, 
or changes in the secular culture). 
Liberals and conservatives within the Catholic Church still disagree over the mechanism 
by which Vatican II caused attrition of clergy from the Church.  Liberals argue that by convening 
the Council the Church created an expectation of even broader reforms, including allowing 
                                                
5 Wilde (2007) provides a fascinating account of how “progressive” bishops managed to outmaneuver conservatives 
in order to engineer an unexpected and revolutionary change in Catholic practice. 
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clergy to marry and laity to practice birth control – practices typical of Protestant denominations. 
When those expectations were dashed, goes the argument, nuns, priests brothers and prospective 
clergy decided that the awaited reforms would not happen in their lifetimes, and reacted by either 
leaving the fold or declining to join in the first place.  
Conservatives have a very different explanation for the attrition of clergy. They 
emphasize that prior the Second Vatican Council, Catholic doctrine accorded priests and nuns a 
status far above that of the laity. The Council ushered in a new era of theological egalitarianism – 
in which every Catholic enjoyed a similar status before God and in which a wide range of roles 
including education, care for the sick and care of the poor, and many church services were 
opened to the laity. The unanticipated effect was to dramatically reduce the status of the clergy 
relative to the laity without reducing key costs (including vows of celibacy and obedience). 
Conservatives thus make the case that nuns and priests responded to their reduced status by 
renouncing their vows (or not taking them in the first place), serving as lay Catholics, and 
enjoying the benefits that come with marriage and secular careers. 
Though the conservative story has come to be more widely accepted than the liberal, for 
our purposes the important fact is that both explanations are exogenous to fertility. 
Official Church statistics provide detailed evidence of institutional losses following 
Vatican II. These diminished the Church’s labor force, undermined its capacity to provide 
traditional services (most notably Catholic schools, day care, and hospitals), and reduced its 
visible presence in community life.6  Stark and Finke (2000), using data from the Official 
Catholic Directory, report that the number of nuns in the U.S. rose steadily from about 140,000 
in 1948 to 180,000 in 1966, the concluding year of Vatican II. Steady growth then immediately 
turns into precipitous decline, dropping to about 90,000 by 1995 and continuing downwards 
thereafter, as illustrated in Figure 2, which is reproduced from Starke and Finke (2000). 
Analogous turning points in the mid-to-late 1960s have been extensively documented in the U.S., 
for the number of priests, average rates of mass attendance, contribution rates, and respect for 
Church doctrine.  
Post-Vatican II declines in clergy do not follow identical paths in all countries, but in 
every developed Western country the number of priests and nuns began to decline dramatically 
within five years of  1965, as we will see below for Western Europe. 
 
3.3 Catholic Social Services  
Before Vatican II the Church played an important role in providing social services in strongly 
Catholic countries and communities. Nuns were instrumental in that provision. In Italy, for 
example, “until 1966 virtually all [pre-schools] were private [and] seventy percent of nursery and 
kindergarten children were cared for by religious sisters.” (Lee, et al, 1967: 165). In the U.S. 
before Vatican II about 50% of Catholic children attended Catholic schools in the 1950s, and 
Catholic hospitals provided about one-fifth of all hospital beds (while Catholics accounted for 
                                                
6 The reforms of Vatican II had the effect of further reducing the visibility of clergy. Nuns stopped wearing 
distinctive habits, popular but mythical saints were dropped from the official catalog, mass was no longer said in 
Latin, confession became optional [and hence rare], and “meatless” Fridays ceased to be required. 
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about one-fourth of the U.S. population) (Fialka 2003: 3). Social life in Catholic communities 
routinely revolved around the Catholic parish and Catholic organizations. 
The number of nuns provides the best single index of Catholic social services, since nuns 
traditionally constituted the primary labor supply staffing Catholic schools, hospitals, and other 
Church-related institutions. Table 1 reports on nuns per 10,000 Catholics in various countries in 
Europe, showing that the level of clergy-provided services varied widely across countries in the 
1960s. (Data sources are documented in Section 5 below.) Examining the seven European 
countries with Catholic majorities, the number of nuns per 10,000 Catholics in 1960 ranged from 
seven in Portugal and eight in Poland to 60 in Ireland. By the year 2000 that range had narrowed 
considerably as the number of nuns per 10,000 declined to 32 in Ireland but remained at seven in 
Portugal. As a result, Irish Catholics, for instance, suffered much more clergy attrition per capita 
after Vatican II than did Catholics in other countries. As reflected in the rightmost column: 
Ireland lost 28 nuns per 10,000 Catholics, France 20, Austria 13 and Italy 11, while in Spain, 
Poland and Portugal, the declines were much smaller: six, one and zero respectively. 
How important could these nuns have been as social service providers? For comparison, 
for each 10,000 people in the U.S. there are 97 teachers (pre-kindergarten through elementary), 
86 nurses and 29 social workers. While the number of nuns/Catholic is less than that in these 
European countries, it is of a similar order of magnitude, especially considering that we have not 
counted brothers, priests and volunteers and that a parallel secular workforce exists in these 
occupations. 
In the U.S., extensive survey data on religious activity and religion-specific fertility 
stretch back to the 1940s. From the mid-1800s through the mid-1900s the Catholic population, 
about one quarter of Americans, remained visibly distinctive – with its own schools, 
characteristic ethnicities, low intermarriage to non-Catholics, and a full complement of “parallel” 
institutions, including churches, social clubs, business associations, civic associations, and 
academic societies. 
The strength and size of Catholic parallel institutions in the U.S. peaked in the 1950s 
(Greeley, McCready, et al. 1976; Greeley 1977). By the late 1960s, most of these institutions had 
closed, shrunk, or became non-sectarian. A comprehensive study of religious orders found that 
between 1962 and 1992, orders of sisters shrank by 42%. The orders shut down 23% of their 
hospitals, 15% of their universities and colleges, and 42% of their elementary schools. By the 
end of the century there were fewer than 81,000 sisters in America (compared to the 1968 peak 
of 180,000) and their median age was sixty-nine (Fialka 2003:17). Overall, 40% of the Catholic 
high schools and 27% of elementary schools closed between 1964 and 1984. These closure rates 
underestimate the loss of nuns. In the schools that remained, the share of non-lay teachers rose 
from under 10% in the 1920s through 1950s to peak at 70% in the mid-1960s, but then declined 
to 46% in 1970, 26% in 1980, 12% in 1990, and 6% in 2000. Those most familiar with Catholic 
schooling data claim the decline was almost entirely induced by supply effects, as nuns left, were 
replaced by (much higher paid) lay teachers, and schools could no longer cover these higher 
staffing costs (Dolan 1985:442, Bryck and Holland 1993: 52).7 
  
                                                
7 Gihleb and Giuntella (2017) use this sharp decline to show that the causal (as opposed to selection) effect of 
Catholic school attendance on student outcomes is negligible. 
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Catholic church attendance and fertility in the U.S. also rose before Vatican II and fell 
afterwards. And as previously noted, Catholic fertility did not merely exceed Protestant fertility 
during the post war “baby boom” it experienced both a magnified rise and fall (Westoff and 
Jones 1979). Since 1965 Catholic fertility has declined by about a child per woman more than 
Protestant fertility, mirroring the excess decline for Catholics in Europe (Hout and Greeley 1987; 
Greeley 1989). Our primary concern is to understand why. In the following section, we will 
develop a general framework that allows us to test competing theories.  
 
4. Economic Fertility and Religion: A Framework for Estimation 
To recap, we seek to explain why fertility declined so much faster for Catholics than it did for 
Protestants after 1965, as seen in Figure 1. As we have noted, Vatican II caused a sharp decline 
in clergy per Catholic in Europe, and that the decline in available clergy reduced both spiritual 
and tangible services supplied to Catholic communities. This section describes competing 
theories and draws out their testable implications. 
 
Several plausible mechanisms linking religiosity to fertility are often discussed: First, 
religion could affect individual preferences for children or for use of birth control. Second, 
religion could influence social norms regarding childbearing or women’s work. Third, religion 
could affect a mother’s educational attainment and thus change the opportunity cost of raising 
children. Fourth, religion could affect national politics and thus the provision of child-friendly 
social services by government. A fifth alternative, which combines institutions and a Becker-
Schultz approach, is that religious communities might reduce the effective price of raising 
children by providing child-friendly social services such as day care, schools, and medical care. 
A club model of denominations would generate a variant of that mechanism, in which families 
that demonstrate more religiosity obtain preferential access to family-friendly services. Finally, 
it’s possible that religiosity and theology are merely symptomatic of attitudes toward fertility that 
change for other reasons.  
 
4.1 Religion in a Fertility Model: Preferences and Service Provision 
A theoretical framework helps clarify how religion might affect fertility. Assume a family 
maximizing a joint utility function for two adults8 and  f children by optimally choosing 
consumption, C, and the number of children  f ,9  
 1 				#$%&,( 	) *, +,µ , 	,ℎ./.	 ) 	*, +,µ = 	1 	*	, +) 	− p $ + − µ 1(+ < 6 . 
Here the family is concerned with consumption per family member c = 
89:( , in the tradition of a 
Becker (1991) quality-quantity model.10 It also gains direct utility from fertility.  
 
                                                
8 For our purposes this could also be a single-parent family in which choices are made by the mother. 
9 Adding leisure as a use of time will not alter the main results, under the homotheticity assumption invoked below.  
10 This formulation differs from Becker’s (1991) demand for children in three ways: first, goods are per-capitized 
over all family members, not only children; second, the use of goods per capita is not necessarily interpreted as 
investment –analytically this makes no difference in a static model; third, we introduce (in (2)) a time-cost of 
childrearing as in Gronau (1977). 
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We also allow the possibility that fertility norms enter a family’s utility, using a 
formulation from research on identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010), in which the family 
experiences disutility associated with the distance between actual fertility, f, and some 
theological (or ideological) constant, µ, representing norms of desired fertility.11 In that term, p  
is the weight associated with a religious identity, which is influenced by religiosity, a. This term 
could also be understood as reflecting the disutility associated with the use of birth control, to the 
extent that it affects fertility, the outcome of interest.  
 
Denoting derivatives with subscripts, we assume that u1, u2  and πa are positive, that u11,  
and u22   are non-negative, that fertility and consumption per capita are weak complements, u12 ≥0, 
and that both increasing in all their arguments, that u(.) is concave, and that u1(0) =  u2(0) = ∞ .  
 
 The family is subject to a budget constraint where a fixed time allocation, T, can be spent 
either on work hours, H, or raising children lf,  
 
(2)     C £ wH = w(T-lf) . 
 
In terms of consumption per capita, the budget constraint is 
 
(2') *	£	 ;<9:( 	= 	;(=>l()9:( 	 . 
 
Religion can enter this budget constraint in three ways. Let q measure the quality of 
social services provided by church, and assume that both q and a affect the time cost of raising 
children l= l(a, q). The idea is that low cost schooling, daycare and health services reduce the 
time required of parents in raising children. One mechanism is through service quality. As 
service quality improves (through longer hours or more attractive church-provided services) then 
the time cost of childrearing would decline in quality, ?l?@ < 0.	(A variant of that mechanism 
would be political, with churches successfully lobbying for public policy changes that lower the 
cost of childrearing.) A second effect of religion is through access. If access to social services is 
preferentially provided to individuals who publicly display religiosity, then  ?l?B < 0	when	G > 0, 
and IJlIBI@ < 0. Conditioning service provision on religiosity by a religious institution is 
rationalized by a club model (Iannaccone 1992, 1999, Berman, 2000). A third channel runs 
through wages. Religious norms and prohibitions tend to reduce the effective wage of women by 
restricting their access to labor and goods markets and reducing their productivity when working 
(as in Berman (2000) and Berman and Stepanyan (2003)), so that w=w(a) ,with ?;?B < 0 . 
 
                                                
11 A more general specification might include leisure. That generalization would not affect the derived estimating 
equations or the analysis that follows. 
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We solve for the optimal choice of consumption and fertility to derive a demand for 
fertility. That optimum is illustrated by point A in Figure 3. The budget constraint (2') slopes 
downward and is convex: I&I( = 	 >K; 9:( >; =>K(9:( J 	= 	 >;[9K:=]9:( J < 0, NO	 IJ&I(J = 		 9;[9K:=]9:( P > 0. 12   
Substituting (2') in (1) yields 	#$%( 		1 ,(R − l+)2 + + 		 , +) 	− p $ + − µ 1(+ < 6 . 
 
The first order condition is then  
 
0 ≥ 		ITI( = 	−1U	;(9K:=)(9:()J 	+ 	19	 + 	p $ 1(+ < 6 . 
 
The infinite marginal utility assumptions rule out solutions at f=0 or c=0, (f=T/λ), so that the 
derivative condition above holds with equality (except possibly for an unlikely solution where 
f=µ, because of a kink in the indifference curve in Figure 3).  
 
 The second order condition assures that the optimum illustrated at A is a unique 
maximum for f ≠ µ,   
 		IJTI(J = 	1UU	[; 9K:=9:( J ]9 − 1U9 ; 9K:=9:( J −	1U 9; 9K:=9:( P + 	199	 < 0	.  
 
Intuitively, this is the result of the indifference curve being more convex than the budget 
constraint.  
  
Solving for the optimal choice of consumption and fertility yields a derived demand for 
children in terms of wages, the weight placed on norms of fertility, and the cost of raising 
children, 
(3)  f( w(a), p(a) , l(a,q) ). 
 
Proposition: Fertility increases in the weight on norms (π) when f < µ and decreases in 
childrearing costs (λ) when f≠µ .  
 
Proof: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem,  
?(?V = 		− IJTI(IV IJT		I(J = −	1(+ < 6) IJT		I(J   >  0 .   
                                                
12 An aspect of the quality-quantity model not emphasized by Becker’s (1991) discussion is that increased 
childrearing costs increase the convexity of the budget constraint: 	 IP&IK(J = 		 W;9:( P > 0, making multiple equilibria 
more likely. That increase in convexity, in turn results from increases in childrearing costs reducing resources more 
for high fertility families. In the figure, increased λ squeezes the budget constraint in along the horizontal axis by 
reducing available time while its’ intercept remains unchanged in terms of available consumption. (Increased wages 
also increase convexity in Becker’s treatment of the question.)  
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X+XY = 		− Z9)Z+ZY Z9)		Z+9 		,			 Z9)Z+ZY = 	−1UU −,+2 + +	, 2Y + R2 + + 9 −	1U 2,2 + + 9 + 	199	 	< 	0	,	 NO		 ?(?K < 0	.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the fertility effect of increased childrearing costs, λ , which shifts the 
budget constraint inward, reducing full income and raising the opportunity cost of each child. 
The new equilibrium is illustrated at point B, where fertility is lower than at point A. Note that 
while fertility is unambiguously reduced, the effect on consumption is ambiguous. Likewise, the 
effect of increased wages on fertility is ambiguous because wages have both income and 
substitution effects, though the literature has emphasized the substitution effect (Becker and 
Lewis, 1973)), operating through the opportunity cost of a mother’s time. 
 
We do not observe w, l , or p, but we can restate the demand for children in terms of 
religiosity, a , and quality of services, q, for which we observe proxies. A reduced form in terms 
of a, q, and an interaction (explained below) is f* 
 
  (4)  f( w(a), p(a) , l(a,q)) = f*(a, q) . 
 
4.2 Predictions for fertility demand 
This equation implies three interesting predictions about how religiosity and service provision 
affect fertility.  
 
First, examining the terms reveals that fertility likely increases in religiosity a, through 
each of three mechanisms: 
 4.1 	X+X$ │G	 = Z+Z,	X,X$ + Z+Z]	X]X$ 	+ Z+ZY 	XYX$ │G	 
 
Starting with the rightmost term, if service provision is conditional on demonstrating religiosity, 
so that religiosity provides preferential access to lower cost childrearing services, as a religious 
club would do, then ?l?B < 0 . Since childrearing costs lower fertility (see the proposition), the 
rightmost term is positive. The middle term is also positive if high religiosity increases the 
influence of norms or theology, p, on a woman’s fertility behavior, since I(IV	is positive (again, by 
the proposition). The left term measures the effect of religiosity on fertility through labor 
markets. If religiosity shifts a woman’s norms away from a lifestyle that encourages human 
capital formation and active labor force participation, we can think of that as religiosity lowering 
market wages, ?;?B  < 0. That term has ambiguous sign since the sign of  ?(?; depends on whether a 
positive income effect of increased wages is dominated by a negative substitution effect 
(analogous to a possibly backward-bending labor supply curve). Empirically, the literature has 
found a dominant substitution effect, ?(?; <0, leading us to cautiously predict an overall positive 
effect of religiosity on fertility in (4.2).  
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 We have the ability to estimate  ?(?B │G	 holding labor force participation constant, 
allowing us to isolate the two rightmost terms, representing norms and the cost of raising 
children, which are unambiguously positive.  
 
A second, and more distinctive prediction is that service quality, q, unambiguously 
increases fertility by lowering the cost of childrearing. Note that this effect is entirely through the 
budget constraint –not through preferences.  
 4.2 	X+XG │$	 = 		 Z+ZY 	XYXG > 0	. 
 
Third, if access to social services is preferentially provided to individuals displaying at 
least some religiosity, a, as a club would do, then social service quality and religiosity will be 
complements in fertility,  
  4.3 	 Z9+Z$ZG = 	Z+ZY Z9lZ$ZG > 0	. 
 
To test those predictions, we will measure religiosity, a, using church attendance  – 
present and past--, allowing us to link observable religiosity to fertility. We will use nuns per 
Catholic as our measure of q, recalling that nuns provided much of the staffing of educational, 
health, and welfare services during the heyday of Catholic social service provision. We turn now 
to a description of data that will allow us to test these predictions. 
 
5. Data 
We make use of data from three sources: administrative data from the Vatican, the International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the World Development Indicators (WDI).  
 
The Vatican collects data for each diocese in the world, including the number of priests 
(diocesan and regular), nuns, churches, schools, hospitals, other institutions, Catholics and new 
baptisms. These data are available dating back to 1959 on an annual basis.13 Figure 4 reproduces 
a page from the 1960 Annuario Ponteficio describing entries for Agra in India and Agrigento in 
Sicily (the birthplace of our native Italian author). 
 
The ISSP provides standard household survey data comparable across countries (31 in the 
1998 wave).14 Critically, it includes a retrospective question on the religious participation of the 
respondents and their parents. The question asks “[W]hen you were around 11 or 12, how often 
did you/your parents attend religious service?” We use that as a measure of religiosity, a . 
 
The ISSP is also our source for church attendance rates. Church attendance trends are 
those calculated by Iannaccone (2007) using the same retrospective questions we used to build 
                                                
13 Unfortunately, the Annuario Ponteficio, dating back to 1959, reports data only at the disaggregated diocesan level, 
without regional or national aggregation. In 1970 the Vatican began publishing aggregates in the Annuarium 
Statisticum Ecclesiae. 
14 For details see www.issp.org . 
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the religiosity measure. Using the 1991 and 1998 wave of the ISSP-the only two waves to ask the 
retrospective questions- Iannaccone builds a time series of church attendance rates for the 31 
countries sampled by the ISSP. That time series covers the 1940s through the 1990s. By careful 
analysis and cross-validation, Iannaccone (2007) finds that the patterns of attendance built from 
the retrospective questions are reliable and remarkably consistent.  
 
From the WDI we obtain Total Fertility Rates, population, education and female labor 
force participation.15 
 
6. Estimation 
Before turning to estimates, a preliminary look at these data are instructive. Figure 5 reports on 
the number of nuns per Catholic in France, Germany, Italy and Spain between 1960 and 2000, 
illustrating that the European pattern of attrition after Vatican II mimics that described in the 
literature for the U.S. In Italy and Germany the number of nuns clearly peaks in 1965, the last 
year of Vatican II, then declines sharply afterwards. France shows a peak in nuns in 1960 after a 
previous increase (not shown) and a sharp decline following 1965. In Spain, rapid growth 
through 1965 is followed by deceleration and then decline after 1970.  
 
Figure 6 reports on both nuns per Catholic and fertility per capita for Ireland, 
foreshadowing the estimation results below. Ireland shows a clear peak in nuns in 1965 
(mirroring Italy and Germany in the previous figure), which corresponds to a peak in total 
fertility rates (shown in the right panel).  
 
Note how rapid the onset of clergy attrition is in Italy, Spain, Germany and Ireland, 
changing from persistent growth to rapid decline between 1965 and 1970 (Figures 5 and 6). This 
is a graphical illustration of the evidence we will use in estimation, indicating that the decline in 
clergy post Vatican II had an immediate effect, over and above any broad trend in the general 
culture’s attitude towards fertility.  
 
Figure 7 reports on church attendance rates, our measure of religiosity, for the same three 
categories of countries reported in Figure 1, between 1960 and 1990. Note that all European 
countries have experienced declines in church attendance (and in other indicators of religiosity –
not shown). While attendance fell by over twenty percentage points in the Protestant countries, 
the decline in the Catholic countries was by only ten percentage points over that 30 year period. 
Explanations for declining Catholic fertility, relative to that of Protestants, must come from some 
mechanism other than declining religiosity. 
 
                                                
15 To validate WDI fertility figures we also used the ISSP to obtain an approximate measure of completed fertility, 
using a series of questions about the number of children living in the household. To assess its quality, we further 
compared the ISSP fertility measure with that obtained by using data from the 1998 wave of the Survey of Italian 
Households’ Income (SIHIW) run by Bank of Italy. The ISSP reported 1.31 children at home whereas the SIHIW 
reported 1.29 children, both of which are very close to the Italian WDI TFR of 1.19 in 1998. The two surveys also 
give very similar results in a regression of children on years of education and other personal characteristics, 
suggesting that all three measures are fairly consistent. 
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6.1 Estimating Equation 
We begin by constructing an estimating equation for the demand for fertility derived in Section 
4, then aggregate it to correspond to the country level data we observe.  
 
For an individual woman, i, we posit a linear version of (4), the demand for fertility, 
 
(5)    fit = as + b r ait + θ r qst +  g rait qrst  + dt +hit 
 
where the superscript r and the subscript s index religious groups, in our case Catholics and non-
Catholics: r є (C,NC), s є (C,NC). Religiosity is an individual characteristic, while quality of 
service provision is common to coreligionists.  
 
 Restating the predictions of our framework (from Section 4.2) in terms of estimated 
coefficients, we have three items of interest. The attendance effect on fertility includes the effect 
of religiosity through opportunity costs, the effect of religiosity through norms, and the effect of 
religiosity through preferentially reduced costs of raising children for church attendees. We posit 
that it is positive, assuming (following the literature) that substitution effects dominate income 
effects in the wage term, _`.  
 4.1 		X+X$ │G	 = Z+Z,	X,X$ + Z+Z]	X]X$ + Z+ZY 	XYX$ = 	_` 	+ g`G		 > 0	.	 
 
The nuns per capita effect on fertility includes both neutral reduced costs of raising children for 
nonattendees, and the preferentially reduced costs for attendees,  
 4.2 		X+XG │$	 = 		 Z+ZY 	XYXG = 	 	a` 	+ g`$	 > 	0	.	 
 
The interaction coefficient, which captures the fertility increase due to preferentially reduced 
costs of raising children for attendees, 4.3 	 Z9+Z$ZG = 	Z+ZY Z9lZ$ZG = 	 g` > 0	. 
 
We seek estimates of bC,  gC and  qC, which will capture, respectively, the effects of norms and 
theology, service provision, and preferential service provision for attendees. 
 
 Aggregating (5) for Catholics in a particular country, c, yields, 
  
(5')    fCct = aCc + bC aCct + θ C qCct +  gCaCct qCct  + dt  +hCct . 
 
 Turning now to measurement, our proxy for religiosity, a, is church attendance rates, as is 
standard in the literature. Social service provision for Catholics is, qC, is proxied by nuns per 
Catholic, recalling the discussion above of the critical role that nuns played in staffing hospitals 
day care centers, schools and welfare services.  
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Unfortunately, we lack estimated fertility rates for Catholics by country, and the ISSP 
does not provide precise estimates of church attendance rates for Catholics separately, forcing us 
to use aggregate fertility as a left hand side variable and to approximate religion-specific church 
attendance rates with national church attendance rates. We discuss possible biases due to these 
forced measurement errors below. 
 
National fertility rates can be expressed as the weighted average of Catholic and Non-
Catholic specific rates, where Pc is the Catholic proportion of the population (this proportion is 
well approximated as time-invariant during the relevant period), i.e., fct = Pc fCct + (1-Pc) fNCct  .  
 
Substituting in (5') and the equivalent equation for non-Catholics yields  
fct = Pc [aCc + bC aCct + θ C qCct +  gCaCct qCct  + dt  +hCct ] 
                     + (1-Pc) [aNCc + bNC aNCct + θ NC qNCct +  gNCaNCct qNCct  + dt  +hNCct ]. 
 
Assuming aCct = aNCct =  act  , and substituting, we get  
 
fct = ac + bNC act + (bNC- bC )Pcact + θ CPc qCct +  gCact PcqCct  + dt  + ect , 
 
where all the time-invariant terms are captured in a country effect ac= Pc aCc + (1-Pc) aNCc ,  
and the error term includes all terms involving unmeasured quality of non-Catholic social 
services, ect = (1-Pc) [ θ NC qNCct +  gNCaNCct qNCct  ] + hCct + hNCct . These omitted variables will 
cause a bias in a fixed effects specification only if the changes in family-friendly services 
available to non-Catholics are correlated with changes in the number of nuns per Catholic.  
 
Denoting nuns per capita as nct  and noting that nct  = Pc qCct  , we simplify our estimating 
equation to   
 fct = ac + bNC act + (bC- bNC )Pcact + θ C nct  +  gCact nct  + dt  + ect . 
 
We estimate in differences over five years intervals. Differencing allows for nonstationarity in 
the error (ect ). A five year interval is chosen rather than a single year interval in order to reduce 
year to year measurement error in church attendance. So our estimating equations are of the form 
 
(6) ∆fct =  bNC ∆act + (bC- bNC ) ∆(Pcact) + θ C ∆nct  +  gC∆(act nct) + ∆dt  + ∆ect  ,  
 
where ∆xt ≡ xt - xt -5 for any variable x. Note that church attendance effects on fertility are 
estimated for both Catholics and Noncatholics, the effect of nuns and the interaction effect are 
estimated for Catholics. 
 
 
6.2 Estimates 
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the variables included in equation (6), with means 
reported in five year differences. Total fertility declined by an average of 0.14 children per 
woman over each five-year interval from 1960 through 2000, a cumulative decline of 1.12 
lifetime children. Nuns per capita, church attendance and their interaction all showed declines, 
but with considerable variation across countries.  
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Table 3 reports estimated effects of religiosity (church attendance) and service provision 
(nuns) for a panel of 14 European countries between 1960 and 2000. These are partial derivatives 
(4.1) and (4.2). Religiosity alone does not significantly predict fertility, when we pool across 
countries with different mixes of Catholics and Protestants, as reported in column (1). That result 
changes when we allow a differential coefficient for Catholics, which yields a weakly 
statistically significant point estimate of 0.025 (column (2)).  
 
Before proceeding, a comment on statistical inference is necessary. Calculating standard 
errors and statistical significance is complicated by the small number of countries in the sample 
(14) and the fact that asymptotic approximations rely on the number of countries, N (rather than 
NxT). We report standard errors clustered by country over time, corrected for the possibility of 
poor asymptotic approximation of a normal distribution by the jacknife-equivalent procedure 
proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002), which corresponds to the “CR3” standard errors of 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). Critical values used to denote statistical significance are 
those of a t-distribution with thirteen (the number of countries minus one) degrees of freedom. 
We have validated the statistical significance of these results using the alternative “wild 
bootstrap” procedure of Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008), which is designed to treat the 
same small-sample problem, but has lower power. Rejection probabilities (p-values) using that 
procedure are quite similar in general. 
 
Now return to the differential attendance coefficient in column (2). It estimates bC- bNC. 
Though only weakly significant it is a fairly large estimate, suggesting that in a (hypothetical) 
entirely Catholic country, a ten percentage point decline in church attendance predicts a TFR 
reduction of 0.25 children relative to that of Protestants. That result is not altered by including a 
measure of female labor force participation (column (3)), which suggests that the effect of 
religiosity through raising opportunity costs of work (the leftmost term in (4.1)) is negligible.  
 
One caveat is the possibility of reverse causality: church attendance might be affected by 
fertility if parents attend church because they feel it benefits their children.16 In the discussion of 
reduced church attendance post Vatican II, the possibility that it occurred because there were less 
children is not mentioned in the literature. Moreover, it would be hard to explain why that 
mechanism appears for Catholics but not for Protestants, who experienced a trend reduction in 
church attendance without a decline in fertility. 
 
 What about service provision, they key innovation in our analysis? The right three 
columns of the table report estimates of the derivative in (4.2), showing very strong evidence of 
an effect of service provision (as proxied by nuns/capita) on fertility. Each nun per capita yields a 
large and statistically significant coefficient ranging from 383 to 408 children, a result that is 
robust across specifications. These coefficients can be interpreted as children per nun since both 
fertility and nuns per capita are normalized by population. Of course, these are only estimates 
                                                
16  The ISSP data provides an excellent resource to further test for this endogeneity bias, because it provides 
retrospective church attendance data dating back many years. A lag would allow some time for religious human 
capital accumulation, religious social capital accumulation, and fertility preference formation by individuals so that 
fertility in the childbearing years can be influenced by attendance in childhood. The same regression using church 
attendance (as children) with 10 or 15 year lags also yields statistically insignificant coefficients (Table 4). The 
results are also robust to adding years of education for women aged 15+ (from the Barro-Lee data) as an alternative 
measure of the economic opportunities of women. The estimated coefficient is positive but insignificant.  
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and should be treated with caution. The standard error on the children per nun estimate in 
column (4) is 124 children. Nevertheless, the magnitude is remarkably large if we were to hazard 
a causal interpretation (more on that below). Apparently, the vows that nuns took not to bear 
their own children are more than compensated for by their effect on the fertility of others! 
 
 Again, we might have some concern with reverse causality, if one thought that the 
number of nuns responds to the demand for service provision, which is in turn tied to fertility. 
The literature on clergy attrition post Vatican II nowhere mentions this possibility, nor can we 
think of a mechanism by which clergy recruitment or attrition responds that quickly to demand; 
clergy typically join for life and leave for personal or theological reasons. Finally, examining 
Figures 5 and 6, we can’t think of a mechanism that would reduce fertility so suddenly and 
differentially in France, Germany, Italy, and Ireland starting in 1965, and in Spain starting in 
1970, to drive the posited reverse causality mechanism. 
 
 Our argument for identification of the coefficient on nuns/capita rests on the assertion 
that the decline in nuns per capita after 1965 was initiated by the exogenous shock of Vatican II, 
generating differential declines in different countries, which for historical reasons had different 
levels of nuns per Catholic when the shock arrived. The data that most closely captures the 
effects of that shock is from the 1960s and 1970s, so as a robustness check, we re-estimated for 
that subsample of the data, to be sure that the results match those in Table III. Those results are 
reported in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2, which show that the coefficient on nuns/capita 
remains large and statistically different from zero for the 1960-1980 sample, while for the shorter 
1960-1975 sample the point estimate remains about the same but the larger standard errors 
preclude drawing statistical inference. (As in Table 3, standard errors are calculated using the 
Bell and McCaffrey (2002) method.) 
 
Referring back to equation (4.1) in the framework section, estimates in columns (1) – (3) 
indicate that there is no evidence for a religiosity (i.e., church attendance) effect on fertility 
among Protestants. Moreover, the evidence in columns (5) and (6) indicate that once we account 
for service provision, q, there is no evidence for a religiosity effect among Catholics either. The 
only effect we find on fertility is the very strong one due to service provision (i.e., about 400 
children per nun). That judgement might be harsh, recalling that church attendance rates by 
denomination were unavailable, so that measurement error might induce some attenuation bias in 
estimating religiosity effects on fertility in this panel. 
 
 Having established that service provision predicts increased fertility, we now turn to 
attempting to establish why. We can explore that by estimating equation (6), which includes an 
interaction term. The pronatalist service provision effect, (a8 	+ g8$)	from equation (4.2), could 
be either unconditional, 	a8, or conditional on church attendance, g`$	. 
 
 Table 4 reports on our attempts to test the conjecture of conditional service provision by 
estimating all the terms of equation (6), which includes as a regressor the interaction of 
nuns/capita with our estimate of Catholic attendance. That requires a short digression on 
measurement. The theory of conditional service provision provides no guidance as to when in 
one’s life a member of a congregation signals religiosity in order to gain access to services. Is it 
current religiosity that matters for a mother, or perhaps religiosity signaled at the age of 
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communion, or in between? We remain agnostic on this point and report interactions of 
nuns/capita with current attendance, attendance lagged ten years, and attendance lagged fifteen 
years. The first column repeats the specification in Table (3) for comparison (383 children per 
nun). Columns (2) through (4) report that we unfortunately lack sufficient precision to estimate 
both a service provision coefficient, θ C, and an interaction, gC when using current attendance as 
our measure of religiosity. While the interaction terms persistently have positive signs, 
suggesting conditional service provision, none of the three are statistically different from zero. 
Moreover, including the interaction term in this specification vastly increases the standard error 
on the “main” effect of service provision, so that nothing can be learned. 
 
Desperate for precision, we consider a compromise. Estimates of attendance are available 
only through 1990, so that dropping current attendance rates from the regression allows two 
more five year periods to be added to the estimation panel, 1990-95 and 1995-2000. If we drop 
the current attendance term from the regression (which was a statistical zero anyway) replacing it 
with a ten year lag, then we can gain some precision in estimating the interaction coefficient. 
That exercise is pursued in columns (5) through (7), using the full sample of five-year 
differences between 1960 and 2000 (eight differences x thirteen countries for a total of 104 
observations). Column (5) reports the baseline regression for the full panel, reporting a 
statistically significant coefficient on nuns/capita of 296 children per nun. That estimate is a 
smaller than the estimates in column (1) using the shorter sample period, but not statistically 
different.  
 
The next column reports coefficients on nuns per capita, attendance lagged ten years, and 
the interaction of nuns/capita and lagged attendance. In this case the interaction has a large and 
weakly statistically significant coefficient of 17.7. The main effect of nuns per capita is large and 
negative, and that of attendance is also negative, but neither are estimated with any precision. To 
put the interaction coefficient in context, at an attendance rate of 82% (the Catholic average in 
1960), each nun would account for (82 x 17.7  - 1032) = 419  children, which is about the same 
size as that from previous estimates.  
 
At the fifteen year lag, the interaction term is statistically insignificant, at 10.8, as are the 
main effects (nuns and attendance).  
 
In summary, while service provision is strongly pronatalist, the results on conditionality 
of service provision are ambiguous. The effects of service provision on fertility might have been 
conditional on attendance, as the evidence in column (6) suggests, but we simply lack sufficient 
precision to say for sure. In terms of section 4.1: 	a` 	+ g`$	 > 	0	,		but we cannot say for sure 
whether that’s because of the unconditional effect, the conditional effect or the combination. 
 
Besides hypothesis testing on mechanisms, an alternative application of these results is to 
ask how much of the unexplained decline in European fertility a decline in Catholic service 
provision can account for. Column (8) of Table 4 reports on the explanatory power of female 
labor force participation, which is a well established predictor of reduced fertility. The constant 
in that regression predicts a decline in fertility of -0.101 per five year period once increased labor 
force participation by women is accounted for, or an unexplained reduction of 0.808 lifetime 
children over the eight five-year intervals between 1960 and 2000. These figures can only 
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provide a rough estimate, as the constants in these regressions are not precisely estimated, but 
comparing the constant in column (5) to that in column (8) indicates that about 30 percent of that 
unexplained reduction [(0.101-0.071)/0.101], or 0.24 predicted children per woman, is accounted 
for by reduced service provision by the Catholic Church. Given the likely attenuation bias in our 
estimates –due to noisy measures of the change in nuns/Catholic, that predicted fertility 
reduction due to a decline in service provision might well be an underestimate.  
 
Are these results heavily influenced by particular periods or countries? As a robustness 
check, Figure 8 illustrates scatterplots of changes in fertility against changes in the key variable, 
nuns/capita interacted with lagged church attendance, with a regression line reporting the slope 
of the coefficient on nun/capita in Table 3, column (6). (These are “leverage” plots from the 
Frisch-Waugh regression). The figure labels observations by the final year of the five-year 
difference, showing that the variation driving the regression is indeed that which occurred in the 
period immediately after the Second Vatican Council, from 1965-70 and from 1970-75. Figure 9 
illustrates the same data, with the observations labeled by country, showing that while Ireland is 
important, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands also contribute to the positive coefficient. As a 
further check on the importance of particular countries we have rerun the regressions omitting 
one country each time, and found that the results are essentially the same. (The regression 
coefficient on nuns/capita omitting Ireland is 365 (p=0.01)). 
 
Finally, a key assumption in our model is that nuns proxy for social service provision 
rather than influencing preferences for fertility through theological influence. That assumption is 
difficult to test directly and we’re uncomfortable assuming completely atheological nuns. An 
alternative way to gauge the relative importance of theology versus social services is to compare 
the influence on fertility of priests, as opposed to nuns. The division of labor in Catholic 
communities is such that a disproportionate amount of theological services are provided by 
priests, while most social services are provided by nuns. Attrition of priests and attrition of nuns 
since the Second Vatican Council is highly correlated, but not perfectly so, allowing the 
possibility of estimating separate coefficients for priest/capita and nuns/capita, in equation (4.2).  
 
Table 5 reports the results of that exercise. Column (1) starts with the baseline 
specification from Table 3. Column (2) shows the same specification with priests per capita 
replacing nuns per capita. The coefficient is large and positive, like that for nuns, but very 
imprecisely estimated. The positive coefficient is not surprising as the correlation of these two 
variables is quite high, so priests could easily proxy for the omitted variable “nuns.” A third 
specification runs a “horserace,” estimating the partial regression coefficient of priests/capita 
with nuns/capita included in the equation. The coefficient on the nuns is large (508 children), and 
positive, but not statistically significant, while that on priests is negative and statistically 
insignificant. Columns (4) through (6) of the Table repeat these specifications, but make use of 
the entire sample of observations through 2000 by dropping the current attendance rate variable 
(which is available only through 1990), as in Table 4. The results remain qualitatively the same: 
nuns strongly predict fertility while priests do not, though the coefficient on priests is very 
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imprecisely estimated. These results are not conclusive but again suggest that the social service 
provision mechanism is more important than the theological mechanism in affecting fertility.17 
 
 
 
6.3 Is the estimate too large?  
Four hundred children per nun appears to be an unreasonably large estimate, on the face of it. 
We provide two possible explanations, one from the theory of fertility transitions and another 
from an organizational theory of religious institutions. 
 
Consider a Becker (1991) style quality-quantity model, which is designed to explain 
rapid fertility transitions. A natural way to illustrate the logic is to augment the household budget 
constraint in Section 4 by adding home production, as in Gronau (1977). For instance, meals 
could be cooked at home rather than purchased, or household maintenance could be self-
provided with home work hours rather than subcontracted to hired help. Assume a home 
production function g(Hh) which is increasing and concave, and that work hours are now split 
between two home and market categories, H = Hh  + Hm . This extension is solved by 
maximization in stages: the household first chooses how much to work at home by setting 
market wages equal to the marginal product of the last hour of home work, w=g'(Hh*), to define 
the optimal budget constraint (should T> Hh*, otherwise Hm=0). In the second stage the 
household optimally chooses consumption and fertility, as in Section 4.  
 
Figure 10 illustrates the resulting budget constraint with a solid black line. It has a 
concave portion at the lower right, reflecting home production, and a convex portion at the upper 
left due to per-capitisation of consumption. This budget constraint admits multiple equilibria, at 
both A and B on the same indifference curve U0, since it has a range between those two points in 
which the marginal cost of an additional child in foregone consumption per capita (quality) 
decreases. Though they share the same utility level, families at A and B enjoy very different 
lifestyles, with the mother in A choosing low fertility and work in the market, while the mother 
in B chooses high fertility and work at home. 
 
The Figure allows an illustration of Becker’s approach to fertility transition. As wages 
increase, the budget constraint would stretch vertically to a higher intercept along the y-axis (not 
shown), allowing higher consumption to working mothers (at A) without consumption gains for 
nonworking mothers (at B). As that process continues, should children not be a luxury good, at 
some high wage equilibrium B would be dominated as all mothers with preferences described by 
U0 go to work.  
 
Now consider the effect of increasing the time costs of childrearing, λ, for families in the 
midst of a fertility transition, indifferent between equilibria at A and B. The utility cost of 
increasing λ at B are much higher than those at A, since they apply to more children. Both 
families would respond by shifting to the unique optimum at C, at low fertility. The formerly 
high fertility family shifting from B to C would experience a sharp decline in fertility due to a 
                                                
17 The results in Table 5 also provide evidence against the political mechanism conjectured in Section 4. It seems 
unlikely that nuns are more effective than priests in lobbying for increased public spending on low cost childrearing 
programs. 
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very small change in the cost of raising children. Between B and C a single nun staffing early 
child education, for instance, could reduce fertility by 400 children. 
 
In summary, a society experiencing the fertility transition as modeled by Becker would 
have a high proportion of families close to indifferent between high and low fertility lifestyles. 
For those families, small changes in childrearing costs due to the removal of the subsidy that 
nuns provided could have triggered a sharp reduction in fertility. 
 
 An alternative explanation for the large fertility decline might come from the important 
role nuns played managing, as well as staffing, faith-based social service provision. These 
institutions typically include a permanent staff of clergy, often supervising lay employees and 
volunteers. The sudden loss of these experienced managers might have sharply reduced the 
quality of services provided by schools, health care facilities and other social service providers. 
We think of this as a complementary explanation, since it also operates through the time costs of 
childrearing, λ. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The data clearly support the service provision mechanism of European fertility decline. 
Declining religiosity may play a role, though only for Catholics, and even so the evidence for a 
religiosity effect might alternatively be interpreted as evidence that family-friendly social 
services were preferentially provided to families demonstrating religiosity.  
 
The evidence for conditional, as opposed to unconditional service provision is 
ambiguous. It does provide a parsimonious explanation for all the results. Referring back to the 
literature, a decline in Catholic service provision, preferentially provided to church attendees, is 
also capable of explaining the anomaly reported by Adsera (2006) for Spain, where religiosity is 
uncorrelated with fertility, perhaps because the level of nuns/catholic has always been relatively 
low. That interaction effect might also explain why Westoff and Jones (1979) find that 
communion and fertility are positively correlated in the 1950s and 1960s for U.S. Catholics, but 
not in the 1970s, by which time inexpensive service provision by the Catholic Church had 
declined in the U.S. (Stark and Finke 2000). Taken together, while we are fairly convinced that 
family friendly Catholic services were fertility enhancing, the evidence is also suggestive that 
these services were preferentially provided to families of churchgoers. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have proposed a novel solution to the Southern European fertility puzzle.  The puzzle is not 
just the South’s unprecedented and rapid transition to low fertility, but also the high fertility that 
went before, the continuing low labor force participation of women, and the resulting fertility 
deficit of nearly one half child per woman in Catholic versus Protestant countries. Our review of 
past research on social service provision in communal religions and our empirical results indicate 
that declining social service provision by the Catholic Church since the Second Vatican Council 
induced substantial decline in fertility among European Catholics. Declining religiosity as 
measured by rates of church attendance does not predict fertility decline.  
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 The data suggest that the observed Catholic fertility effect is due less to changing 
preferences or norms than to an institutional decline which reduced family-friendly social 
services available in Catholic communities. Otherwise it is hard to explain why the withdrawal 
of social service provision, as measured by nuns/capita, predicts so strongly the fertility decline 
of European Catholics. That interpretation is consistent with the literature linking low fertility to 
the lack of family-friendly institutions for the children of working mothers in contemporary Italy 
and other Southern European countries (Del Boca, 2002; Del Boca et al, 2003). It may be that 
receding Church services left a vacuum in family-friendly social service provision long since 
filled by government in northern European countries.  
 
Further support for this interpretation comes from Chou’s (2011) study of second 
generation immigrants in the US.  Those from Catholic majority countries in Europe experienced 
a fertility decline well predicted by declining fertility in their parents’ country of origin. This 
trans-Atlantic correlation exists even though the fertility decline in Europe occurred after their 
mothers’ emigration, which would be consistent with withdrawal of subsidized family-friendly 
services in the form of nuns from a Catholic family’s country of origin. 
 
Understanding how social service provision affects fertility may be critical to 
understanding fertility trends among European Catholics and to projecting European 
demographics over the next generation. Moreover, the implications extend beyond the half-
billion residents of Europe or even the billion Catholics worldwide. The populations and leaders 
of less developed countries look to Europe and wonder whether prosperity and greatly increased 
female labor market participation inevitably imply graying populations and demographic decline. 
These inferences may not be warranted if, as we find, rapid fertility decline in Catholic Europe is 
not so much due to economic development, female labor force participation, or even 
secularization, as it is due to the loss of Church-based family-friendly social services.  
 
The finding that costs of childrearing rather than theology or norms matter most has 
potentially important public policy implications. Religious groups may strongly support social 
service provision in some times and places, but very different institutional arrangements may be 
required to support their continued provision as clergy withdraw from volunteer service. Our 
conclusions might more generally be important for any society facing rapid economic and social 
change, and especially for societies in which women are increasingly torn between labor market 
opportunities and the high shadow cost those impose on child care. That tension may be much 
greater the less support is available from religious communities, other social networks, markets, 
or governments. 
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